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LIABILITIES OF ORGANIZERS, MEMBERS AND
OFFICERS OF A PRIVATE CORPORATION
UNDER THE INDIANA LAW
ROBERT W. MIILEI*
By a concurrent resolution, approved March 1, 1927, the last
General Assembly provided for the appointment of the Indiana
Corporations Survey Commission to investigate the orgamza-
tion, operations, activities and control of private corporations in
the state of Indiana, with the view of enacting a new Corpora-
tion Act.' The liabilities discussed in this article are the pres-
ent liabilities imposed by our laws and affect all corporations
now in existence. As will be seen, a Uniform Business Corpo-
ration Act is much in demand and the Corporations Survey
Committee can do an excellent piece of work for Indiana by the
proposal of a new Corporation Act.
I
PROMOTERS
A promoter is one who brings together the persons who become
interested in the enterprise, aids in procuring subscriptions, and
sets in motion the machinery which leads to the formation of
the corporation itself. It is the promoter's work which brings
the corporation into existence.
While ordinarily a promoter ceases to be such when the cor-
poration is fully formed and the business turned over to the
directors, such is not necessarily the ease. As long as the work
of formation continues, those carrying on such work retain the
character of promoters.a
* See biographical note, p. 121.
'Indiana Law Journal, Vol. III, p. 223.
'a A promoter may also be an incorporator, subscriber, shareholder,
director or other officer in a private corporation, and, in the usual case,
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The promoters of a corporation are not the agents of the
corporation before it comes into existence, for there cannot be
an agency unless there is a principal.2  Since promoters are not
the agents of a corporation not yet formed, it follows that a
dontract made by them does not bind the corporation, when
formed, in the absence of a statute, adoption, or a provision in
the charter to that effect. 3 This question of personal liability of
promoters by reason of contract will be discussed later.
The chief place where the tort liability of promoters is in
question is where a fraudulent prospectus is issued. If the pro-
moters of a corporation put forth a fraudulent prospectus, or
otherwise make fraudulent representations, and such actions of
the promoter cause third persons to become interested in the cor-
poration's shares and securities to the damage of- such third
persons, a direct action exists in favor of such persons against
those who have been guilty of the fraud, to recover such dam-
ages.4
Individual liability also exists where the promoter commits
any other tort such as trespass, conversion, nuisance, negligence,
etc., and, under the rule that where several join actively in the
promotion of a corporation a joint and several liability for the
fraud and false representations of the others exists, one of sev-
eral promoters may thus be liable for the torts of the others.
The general rule that the tort feasor is liable for his torts applies
does occupy one or more of these positions. However, for the sake of
clarity the liabilities of each group of such persons individually will be
considered and where a promoter does occupy more than one relation to
the corporation, his liabilities will be considered as the sum total of the
liabilities of each group under which he may be classified. In this article,
preference has been given to Indiana and 'Federal decisions where such
are in point, an effort being made to present the liability aspect from
the point of view of Indiana decisions.
2 Smith v. Parker (1897), 148 Ind. 128. However, it is well settled that
they occupy a fiduciary relationship to the corporation when it comes into
existence and to the subscribers prior to its organization, while acting as
promotors. Cushion Heel Shoe Co. v. Hartt (1914), 181 Ind. 167.
3 A contract made by the promoters of a corporation is not binding upon
the corporation when formed unless such a contract was made upon the
corporation's credit and with the mutual expectation that the promoters
would form the corporation and that the comporation would assume the
contract. Davis Bldg. Co. v. Hillsboro Creamery Co. (1893), 10 Ind. App.
42. The act of the corporation in adopting contracts entered into by pro-
moters prior to its creation is considered, by the weight of authority, as
a novation or the making of a contract by the corporation as of the date
of such adoption. Smith v. Parker (1897), 148 Ind. 128.
4 Grover v. Cavanaugh (1907), 40 Ind. App. 340.
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as well to individuals who are acting in the capacity of promo-
ters, as to any other individual.
The liability of promoters by reason of contracts has been
fairly well settled by Supreme Court decisions. Promoters are
personally liable on contracts entered into personally, even
though made for the benefit of the projected corporation and
though the corporation has been formed and has received the
benefit of the contract.5 However, they are not personally liable
where the contract is made in the name and solely on the credit
of the projected corporation, provided such intention is clear to
both parties of the contract and that neither express nor implied
representations that there is an existing corporation have been
made. This exception falls, however, if the contract entered
into is one which the corporation when formed has no power to
ratify or adopt.6 A promoter who makes a contract in behalf of
a corporation to be organized, providing there is no provision
exempting him from liability, is personally liable on such con-
tract.7 In the absence of statute, however, promoters are not
personally liable on a contract made in the name of the corpo-
ration after it has acquired a complete corporate existence.
8
A question of prime importance in the fixing of promoters'
liability is the duty due from them to the proposed corporation
and the corporation after it is formed. Needless to say, the
promoters occupy toward the corporation and towards the per-
sons who become shareholders therein a fiduciary relation.
They must act with the utmost good faith in their dealings on
behalf of and with the corporation and its stockholders, and will
be liable to the corporation, either at law or in equity, according
to the circumstances, for any fraud or breach of trust.9
The general-rule is had that promoters must account for any
secret profit made by them, this rule applying only where they
are acting for the corporation, or a fiduciary relation otherwise
exists, or where there is fraud.10 However, there is no rule of
G Bonsall v. Platt (1907), 153 Fed. 126.
6Harill v. Davis (1909), 168 Fed. 187.
7 O'Rorke v. Geary, 207 Pa. St. 240. Promoters are personally liable for
obligations when they assume to contract in the name of and on the behalf
of the corporation before it has acquired even a de facto organization.
Heisen v. Churchill (1913), 205 Fed. 368.
SRyland v. Hollinger (1902), 117 Fed. 216.
9 Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co. (1899), 176 U. S. 181.
10 Promoters will either be compelled in a proper action to refund any
secret profits made by them while acting for the corporation, or in dealing
with the corporation without a full and fair disclosure of the facts, or the
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law which prevents a person who owns property, although pur-
chased by him for the purpose, from promoting a corporation
and selling the property to the corporation after its organization.
It has been stated, however, that the promoter should follow one
of four courses to make the contract with the corporation abso-
lutely binding where such a transaction is had.11
The Supreme Court has held that no action will lie against the
promoters for sale of property to the corporation at a large profit
to themselves, when at the time of the transaction the promoters
owned all the stock of the corporation, no profit being realized
until later when a sale to the public was had. The Court was of
the opinion that the profit had to be made at the time of the
alleged illegal act in order for accounting to be required.12
Before considering the liability of promoters to purchasers of
stock, the liability of one promoter to another should first be
stated. As a general rule, where the contract is definite and the
obligations are clear, an action at law will lie at the instance of
one promoter against a second for breach thereof upon failure to
proceed with the promotion. 13 Liability of promoters between
themselves is usually based upon some agreement, though none
is necessary. Promoters occupy a position of trust and con-
fidence, hence good faith is essential. On this basis one pro-
moter may compel others guilty of fraud or breach of trust by
corporation may recover damages for the fraud at law or in equity, or in a
proper case rescind the transaction and recover what is parted with.
Paker v. Boyle (1912), 178 Ind. 560.
11 Four methods are: (1) Provide an independent board and make a
full disclosure to the corporation through them; (2) make a full disclosure
of all material facts to each original subscriber of shares in the corpora.
tion; (3) procure a ratification of the contract after disclosing its circum-
stances by vote of all the shareholders of the completely established corpor-
ation, or (4) person may himself be the real subscriber of all the shares of
the capital stock contemplated as a part of the promotion scheme. Old
Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159. The above four safe-
guards are used in order to protect the corporation from entering into a
fraudulent or harmful contract with the promoter.
12 Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn (1908), 210 U. S. 206. The
Massachusetts case, supra note 11, is contra to the federal rule and holds
that it is no defense that the promoters at the time of the transaction were
the only stockholders. Davis v. Las Ovas Co. (1913), 227 U. S. 80, holds
that promoters who join in defrauding the corporation by false repre-
sentations or concealment, or by fraudulently taking a secret profit, or pro-
moters and third persons who participate with them in the fraud, are joint-
ly and severally liable for the whole loss thereby sustained by the cor-
poration.
18 Abbot v. Hapgood, 150 Mass. 248.
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taking a secret profit, misappropriating funds, etc., to account
in equity. Also, where one promoter pays a debt for which the
other promoters are liable, he is entitled to contribution. 14
In addition to the liability to the corporation, a separate liabil-
ity exists to individual stockholders. In fixing this liability, an
examination of the prospectus is extremely important. Of
course, promoters may enter into any special agreement with the
subscribers or purchasers of the stock which is legal, and thereby
fix their liability. Where the ones originating the scheme, after
procuring the money to be paid in, abandon it, certain Illinois
cases hold that the subscribers may recover back the money paid
without any deduction for expenses incurred. 15 A liability may
also arise where fraudulent representations induced the de-
frauded subscriber to subscribe, or where concealment of the
true facts was had. An action of deceit will lie against such
promoters.
The above liabilities constitute in general those imposed upon
a promoter of a private corporation.
II
INCORPORATORS
The state creates the corporation upon the application of
individuals who are called incorporators. This application is
usually made by signing and presenting the incorporation papers
to the proper officer. 16 Broadly stated, corporators need only
have the capacity to contract, no other qualifications being re-
quired in the absence of statute to the contrary.
Hence, to form a corporation under a general law, the corpo-
rators or members must have the qualifications and must be of
the number prescribed by statute; and there must be at least
14 Edenborn v. Sim (1913), 206 Fed. 275.
15 Lang v. Blocki, 286 fll. 91. One who subscribes for stock in a corpora-
tion which fails to complete its organization may recover the money so paid
from the one to whom he paid it; but, in order to hold any or all of the
promoters of an abortive corporation, he must show that the person so re-
ceiving the money sought to be recovered was authorized to receive it for
the corporation, and that he, in fact, did so receive it. Fitzwiliam v.
Travis, 65 Ill. App. 183.
16 "Whenever three or more persons shall desire to form a corporation,
they shall prepare, sign and acknowledge, in duplicate, before a notary
public and file with the Secretary of the State, articles of incorpora-
tion. . . ." Burns' Statutes (1926), Sec. 4825.
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substantial compliance with the provisions of the act, unless they
are merely directory or conditions subsequent, in order to have
a de jure corporation. A failure to comply with the statute in
these respects would not, however, preclude the existence of a
de facto corporation.
A number of our modern statutes require each subscriber to
the articles of incorporation to subscribe for at least one share,
writing after his name the number of shares he takes. Where
such a statute exists the question arises as to the time when
such signatories to the paper become actual shareholders as dis-
tinguished from persons who have agreed to become sharehold-
ers. In an early Indiana case it was held that the subscribers
of the incorporation paper might elect the directors even before
the recording of the instrument.17
Where the enabling act does not require the corporators to
become stockholders, the chief duty of the incorporators is to
organize the corporation and set it in motion.18 Often, how-
ever, the incorporation laws require that the incorporation paper
shall fix the number of the directors, and shall state the names
of the first directors. 19
It is a very common practice for the incorporators not to be
the substantial promoters of the enterprise, but only mere clerks
or dummies. The courts have judicially disapproved of this
practice, declaring such to be foreign to the intent of the incor-
poration laws. 20
Where an enterprise proves unsuccessful for want of sufficient
funds to meet the statutory requirement, personal liability exists
on the part of the corporators to return to the subscribers funds
collected, regardless of whether the failure is due to conspiracy,
fraud or negligence. Incorporators who permit a portion of
their number to divert funds subscribed for the enterprise to an
17 Covington Plank Road Co. v. Moore (1852), 3 Ind. 510.
18 Danforth, 3.: "The corporators are the associates who are the get-
ters-up of the company, and whose functions cease with its organization.
Corporators exist before shareholders, and do not exist with them. When
stockholders come in, corporators cease to be." Chase v. Lord, 77 N. Y. 1.
19 It is not necessary to state in the incorporation papers the names of
the first directors unless the statute requires it to be done. Miller v. Gravel
Co. (1875), 52 Ind. 51. But where such a clause is had, it is deemed man-
datory and a total failure to comply therewith renders the incorporation
open to attack. Reed v. Richmond St. R. R. Co. (1875), 50 Ind. 342. In the
light of this, some incorporation laws provide that corporators shall act as
directors during the first year.
20 Wechselberg v. Flour City National Bank (1894), 64 Fed. 90.
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unauthorized purpose, are guilty of negligence and breach of
trust and liable to subscribers who suffer loss thereby.
For exemption from personal liability to be available to incor-
porators, all material requirements of the enabling act must be
complied with.21 Where the assumption of the corporate priv-
ilege was naked, the associates have uniformly been held to full
liability to the other contracting party, assumption being naked
where business is transacted without recording the certificate of
incorporation, filing or publishing same as required by law, etc. 22
There are but very few decisions dealing with the liabilities of
incorporators as such. Incorporators are often promoters and
stockholders as well; hence they have a merged liability.
III
SUBSCRIBMERS
Subscribers to a corporation are those who on the formation
of a corporation agree mutually to take and pay for the shares
of capital stock, and, in the absence of any special provision,
they agree with each other to pay therefor the par value of the
stock. Strictly speaking, a subscriber is one who has agreed
with the corporation to take a certain number of shares in the
corporation by original issue, the term not being the same as
stockholder.
As stated previously, some states require incorporators to set
opposite their names the number of shares which they desire to
take in the corporation. This is sufficient to constitute them sub-
21 Of course if the corporators carry on business before recording the
certificate or performing other conditions precedent to incorporation, they
may be subject to a partnership liability (unless there be a de facto cor-
poration) as members of an unincorporated association. Ryland v. Hol-
linger (1902), 117 Fed. 216. Where an association of persons have com-
plied with the provisions of the law necessary to constitute them a corpora-
tion, and have fixed the amount of their capital stock, but have not divided
it, and in this situation contract debts, the individual members are jointly
and severally liable for such debts. H/awes v. Anglo-Saxon Co., 101 Mass.
385. Where a contract is made in the corporate name after the articles of
incorporation have been filed, but before any subscriptions have been ob-
tained, and before an organization meeting has been held or officers elected,
the incorporators are liable on the contract as partners. MoVicker v. Cone,
21 Ore. 353.
22 Collateral attack is permitted to the other contracting party to hold
incorporators to their partnership liability, but not other members of the
company where there is only naked assumption.
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scribers and, even where not required by statute, still there is
nothing illegal in incorporators subscribing for stock in this
fashion.23 Where such subscription is had, it is held that any
such subscriber may retract or cancel his subscription before
the paper is recorded with the consent of all his co-subscribers. 24
As soon as the incorporation paper has been signed and duly
recorded, each subscriber is irrevocably bound to accept the
number of shares for which he signed. The rule is some-
times had that an agreement to take shares entered into by
executing the incorporation paper of a projected corporation
cannot, at least in England, be rescinded for fraud on the part of
the promoters. The Indiana rules on this point are contra.25
Hence, in general, we may say that the obligation of subscribers
of an incorporation paper is to pay the par value of the shares
for which they subscribed, in installments when called in by the
proper authority; this obligation only being fulfilled by taking
shares from the company and not by transfer from another
stockholder.
A contract of subscription for stock in a corporation, when
binding, is a contract between the corporation and the sub-
scriber; a valid contract being required to constitute a person a
subscriber. 26 No matter whether a subscription is made before
or after the formation of the corporation, an offer by the one
party and acceptance by the other is essential, the contract being
one to take and pay for the stock upon the terms and conditions
stated in the offer.
Where an agreement to form a corporation and to take stock
therein is entered into, the intention of the parties being to con-
tract with the corporation, such subscription is considered as a
continuing offer to the proposed corporation, and becomes a
binding contract as soon as the corporation is formed and ex-
23 Heaston v. Cincinnati R. R. Co. (1861), 16 Ind. 275. Where a person
intends to become a corporator, he cannot without some further act or offer
on his part be held as a subscriber to the capital if the company is in-
corporated by other persons. Richmond St. R. R. Co. v. Reed (1882),
83 Ind. 9.
24 Cravs v. Eagle .Cotton Mills Co. (1889), 120 Ind. 6.
25 Wert v. The Crawfordsville Turnpike Co. (1862), 19 Ind. 242.
26 Butler University v. Scoonover (1887), 114 Ind. 381. A subscription
for stock and a contract to purchase stock from a corporation are not the
same, the latter not making the purchaser a subscriber or stockholder until
it is executed by delivery of the certificate of stock. Such a tender is not a
condition precedent in the case of pure subscription.
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pressly or impliedly accepts the same. 27 In the case of subscrip-
tions after a corporation has been formed and is in existence, an
offer and acceptance of such offer is essential in order to bind
both subscriber and corporation. 28 Hence, a subscription for
stock cannot be revoked by the subscriber after it has been
expressly or impliedly accepted by the corporation, a binding
contract then being had which permits of withdrawal, if at all,
only with the consent of the other party.
Where subscription to stock is made prior to incorporation
and formation of the company and in contemplation thereof, it
is considered a condition precedent that the corporation shall be
legally organized as contemplated in order for liability to attach
to the subscriber upon his contract. 29 If the subscription con-
tract is entered into after the formation of the corporation, a
showing of a de facto corporation is sufficient for the corporation
to maintain an action upon the contract. 30 There is seemingly
a conflict, however, where the subscriber contracts on the basis
that the corporation is a legally formed corporation, while in
fact it is nakedly assuming corporate existence. Some juris-
dictions apply the doctrine of estoppel and enforce the contract,
while others hold such a good defense for the subscriber.
27 The fact that the corporation is not in existence at the time the offer
is first made by signing the agreement does not prevent the corporation
from accepting when formed. Miller v. Wildcat Gravel Co. (1875), 52
Ind. 51.
28 Junction R. Co. V. Reeve (1860), 15 Ind. 236. Since there must be
mutual assent to constitute a binding subscription contract, a corporation
formed for other purposes or with other powers than those contemplated
by the subscribers can not enforce the subscription against non-consenting
parties. In the absence of provision to the contrary, consideration is re-
quired for a binding subscription. Mutuality of obligation is required and
if, for any reason, the corporation is not bound, the subscriber is not bound.
Marion Trust Co. v. Bennett (1907), 169 Ind. 346. In the absence of statute
or contrary provision, subscription contract may be informal. Brownlee v.
Ohio I. & 1. R. Co. (1862), 18 Ind. 68. But where a definite formulae is
had, subscription contract must comply to be binding. Coppage v. Hutton
(1890), 124 Ind. 401. Subscriptions may be implied by conduct. Overmyer
v. Cannon (1882), 82 Ind. 457. Being a contract, both parties must be com-
petent to contract; an infant's contract being voidable where no statute is
had forbidding him to subscribe. Indianapolis Chair Mfg. Co. v. Wilcox
(1877), 59 Ind. 429.
29 There must be, in the absence of estoppel, not merely a corporation
de facto, but a corporation de jure. Indianapolis Furnace & Mining Co. v.
Herhimer (1877), 59 Ind. 429.3O Heaston v. Cincinnati R. R. Co. (1861), 16 Ind. 275.
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In the case where a contract has been made for the issue of
stock at a discount or for overvalued property, in spite of mod-
ern statutes expressly requiring money or money's worth, a con-
flict as to the position of the parties exists. The Supreme Court
has held that where the corporation consists only of such persons
who assented to the illegal issue, the corporation has no remedy
against the subscriber. Where the corporation is composed of
innocent shareholders an action may be maintained, some courts
not permitting cancellation and enforcing full payment for the
shares ;31 while other courts hold the subscriber not liable.8 2 In
the case where the interests of the creditor are concerned, such
creditor stands in the same position as the corporation and in
those jurisdictions holding the issue void, the creditor is deprived
of his remedy.33 Other jurisdictions permit the creditor, where
necessary, to force the subscriber to fully pay for the stipulated
shares, cancellation of the shares not protecting the creditor in
the least and the amount not yet paid being an asset of the corpo-
ration to which the creditors may have recourse. In any of
these cases, the wisdom of the statutes or decisions must be de-
termined by the amount of protection afforded to the public, the
creditors, and the innocent shareholder. Certainly those juris-
dictions which bluntly hold void the issue of stock for overvalued
property or for property that is not legal payment, do not, in
many situations, seem to serve best the interests of any one of
these three groups.
Another problem is presented in case the defendant is not a
subscriber but a subscriber's transferee. Of course, if he is a
transferee with notice, actual or constructive, of the true state
of the transaction, he is in no better position than his trans-
feror.8 4 But if he is an innocent purchaser of a certificate as for
fully paid and non-assessable shares, the corporation should not
be allowed to maintain any action against him. Hence the cor-
poration cannot cancel shares of a bona fide transferee of a sub-
scriber.3 5 Where creditors seek to hold innocent transferees of
subscribers, it has almost universally been held that the creditor
31 Scully v. Automobile Finance Co., 109 A. 49. Such a contract is con-
sidered as having a two-fold aspect: (1) To take the stock at a discount
and, (2) to take the stock. The first, being illegal, is disregarded and suit
is brought on the second.
82 Kaaman v. Gahagan, 230 S. W. 141.
83Savell v. Bullach, 174 N. W. 764.
34 Bawn v. Imperial Theatres, 115 A. 918.
35 Rhode v. Dock-Hop Co., 194 P. 11.
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must suffer, as he might properly be given a recovery against the
corporate officials.30
In this article the defenses available to a subscriber such as
fraud, mistake, false representation, etc., will not be discussed,
the assumption being that a valid contract of subscription is
made and that no release or discharge of the subscriber
effected.37
The validity and effect of the contract of subscription and the
liability thereby imposed upon the subscriber are to be deter-
mined in accordance with the laws of the state in which the
corporation was created. In addition, the provisions of the
corporate charter or of the general laws by which the corpora-
tion is governed becomes a part of the contract of subscription.
Hence, the contract and the liabilities, there inflicted must be
construed in connection with such laws and provisions.88 In all
jurisdictions a corporation may maintain an action of assumpsit
to recover the amount of a due and unpaid subscription, or of an
assessment or call thereon, if there is an express promise to pay
the same. Seemingly, most states imply a promise on the part
of the subscriber to pay all valid assessments where a valid con-
tract of subscription is had.39 In the case where the corporation
36 Supra, note 35.
37 A subscriber may be released in whole or in part from his contract
by the corporation with the consent of all the other stockholders; but he
cannot withdraw and surrender his shares without the consent of the cor-
poration; nor can he do so with the consent of the corporation, unless all
the other stockholders consent; nor can he do so with the consent both of
the corporation and all the other subscribers, if the amount due from him
is required to pay corporate debts.
A subscriber is released by forfeiture of his stock to the corporation for
non-payment of assessments, but not by a sale of his shares to pay assess-
ments, where, under the charter, he is liable for any deficiency.
A subscriber is released by a valid transfer of his shares, whereby the
transferee takes his place, and assumes his liability as a shareholder. Clark
on Contracts, p. 403.
38 Falmouth and L. Turnpike Co. v. Shawhan (1886), 107 Ind. 47.
39 Millier 'v. Wild Cat Gravel Road Co. (1875), 52 Ind. 51. A call is an
official corporate declaration requiring a prescribed part of subscriber's
stock to be paid for at once. Calls to be valid must be made in the manner
prescribed, by the person or board designated, and must operate uniformly
on all the stockholders. Liggett v. Glenn (1892), 51 Fed. 381. Where the
time is fixed for payment a call is not necessary, but otherwise where the
time of payment is to be fixed by the directors or stockholders. Banty v.
Buckles (1879), 68 Ind. 49. Assessment signifies statutory payments levied
by the corporation upon the holder of its shares, over and beyond the par
value of its stock. Interest runs on assessments from the time they are
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seeks to recover for the amount of calls, it may either wait until
all become due and collect or sue as each call becomes due. How-
ever, all installments which are due must be recovered in a single
.ction.
In summary, the liability of a subscriber may be said to be
based upon the subscription contract. The contract is the meas-
ure and extent of his liability which, generally speaking, may be
said to pay the par value of the shares subscribed for and, in
addition, to meet all calls and assessments which are properly
levied. The liability of a subscriber is not absolutely clear due
to the fact that the subscriber usually becomes a stockholder and
thus there is a combined liability, with but few decisions separat-
ing this liability into its component parts. 40
IV
STOCKHOLDERS
A subscription to any legal and valid instrument, by which a
person engages to become a member of the -corporation when
organized, and to pay a given sum which is to be a part of the
capital stock followed up by an acceptance of a certificate for
the stock, will make such subscriber a shareholder of the corpo-
ration.41
A contractual relationship exists between the corporation and
shareholders, such contract to be interpreted in the light of the
corporate charter and by-laws, governing statutes, and the set-
tled law of the land. 42 This relationship, even where the stock-
holder is personally interested, does not preclude him from
payable, thus increasing the amount of liability in case of delinquent pay-
ment.-May v. Ullich, 132 Mich. 6.
40 The proposed Uniform Business Corporation Act states the subscrib-
er's liability as follows: "A subscriber to or holder of shares of a corpora-
tion . . . shall be under no liability to the corporation with respect to
such shares other than the obligation of complying with the terms of the
subscription therefor; but one who became a shareholder in good faith and
without knowledge or notice that the shares he acquired had not been fully
paid for, shall not be liable to the corporation with respect to such shares."
41 A mere subscription to stock does not ipso facto constitute the sub-
scriber a stockholder. Wheeler v. Thayer (1889), 121 Ind. 64. Any con-
duct expressly or impliedly showing that the corporation recognized the
subscriber as a stockholder and that the subscriber assented to being a
stockholder is sufficient to constitute the subscriber a stockholder. Gowdy
Gas Well Co. v. Patterson (1902), 29 Ind. App. 261.4 2 McCallister v. Shannondale Co-op. Tel. Co. (1911), 47 Ind. App. 517.
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voting for a contract or other measure at a meeting of the cor-
poration. Being permitted to deal with the corporation, profits
made by him in the course of his dealings belong to him
personally, the corporation or other stockholders having no in-
terest therein. A shareholder may become a creditor of the
corporation, and, where such does happen he stands on equal
footing with the other creditors.43
The capital stock and assets of a corporation belong to it and
may be disposed of by it, if it does not violate its charter, as fully
and freely as if it were a natural person, subject to statutory
limitations and the right of creditors to attack any transactions
as fraudulent. No direct trust, at least where the corporation
is a going concern, attaches to its property in favor of creditors.
As a general rule, however, statutes usually limit this right of a
corporation to contract to "money or the true value in prop-
erty."44
The discussion on calls and assessments given earlier in this
article is also applicable in a discussion of stockholders liability.
Ordinarily, an assessment may be levied and collected on fully
paid stock, where authority to do so is conferred by the articles
of incorporation, or statute, or by agreement; but not other-
wise.45 Generally, an assessment can only be levied upon per-
sons who are stockholders at the time and a person who has
ceased to be a shareholder, due to a valid transfer of his shares,
etc., cannot be assessed.
Where a shareholder converts corporate funds, obtains prop-
erty from the corporation by false representation, or is unlaw-
fully holding corporate property, the corporation may maintain
an action against him. The Courts will not permit a fraud to
43 The general and well settled rule is that contracts and dealings be-
tween a corporation and its stockholders are valid if the stockholders do
not also act as the agents of the corporation in the matter and if no fraud
is committed against other shareholders or creditors. There is nothing in
the relation between a corporation and its stockholders which peir se pre-
vents dealings between them.
44 A contract to take stock has two- aspects: (1) to take the stock, and
(2) to take such at a discount, where such is the essence of the contract
Hence, where the corporation issues its stock at a discount or for over-
valued property and intends to so contract, the purchaser may still be liable
for the balance-due to the first aspect of the contract; the second aspect
being disregarded as contrary to statute. Although the corporation itself
may be precluded from calling upon the stockholder for additional amounts,
the creditor, in case of insolvency or where such payment is necessary to
meet corporate debts, may sue and have payment made into the corporation.
45 Toner v. Faulkerson (1890), 125 Ind. 224.
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be committed on the corporation, especially where the rights of
creditors and innocent stockholders are involved.
Hence, in general, it may be said that the chief liability of a
shareholder to the corporation is upon his contract, but that, in
addition, he is liable for any fraud, conversion, or other tort
perpetrated on or in connection with the corporation or its prop-
erty. Fair play is essential and in determining whether or not
such transactions are honest, the enabling act, corporate charter
and by-laws, and the law of the land must be closely scrutinized.
Where there has been a failure to incorporate or where there
has been an attempt to form a corporation under an unconstitu-
tional statute or for a purpose not authorized by statute, the
persons attempting such an incorporation are held liable as part-
ners where not even a de facto corporation is accomplished. A
reason given for the personal liability of the associates is that
there is no responsible body or corporation behind them; that,
having no principal, they bind themselves individually. Some-
times the same result is reached on the basis of estoppel.46
The corporation is not the only party to whom stockholders
may have to answer, for many times one stockholder may
sue another. For instance, where one stockholder has paid
more than his share of a corporate debt, he may enforce con-
tribution from other shareholders. Contribution may be had
where payment was made on account of statutory or subscription
liability, but not where made on account of a penal liability.47
Minority stockholders may sue the majority where there has
been a misappropriation of the corporate assets. Those who
have paid assessments on their stock may sue to compel delin-
quent shareholders to pay or to have their liability declared.
There are numerous cases in which one stockholder may sue
another, but the above constitute the more common suits.
Heretofore, the liability of a stockholder to the corporation
and to other shareholders has been considered. In addition to
such liability, there are the rights of creditors to be considered.
The capital stock of a corporation is the basis of its credit since,
in the absence of statute, no personal liability is inflicted upon
the stockholder for corporate debts. Hence, it would seem to
46 Persons who assume to act in a corporate capacity without a legal
existence as a corporation, either de jure or de facto, are personally and
individually liable as partners to those with whom they contract. .Owen v.
Shapard (1894), 59 Fed. 746.
47 Liability to contribute survives the death of a steokholder. AUen v.
Fairbanks (1889), 40 Fed. 188.
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follow that where persons deal with a corporation on the faith
of this fund, that such persons may insist that it shall be paid
in, when its payment is necessary for the satisfaction of their
claims against the corporation. Such has been held to be the
law, shareholders of an insolvent corporation being compelled to
pay the amount due on their stock into the corporation to satisfy
corporate debts. The liability to so pay in is based, by some
courts, upon the trust fund doctrine that the capital stock is a
trust fund for the benefit of creditors.48 However, it is very
difficult to see that this is the true basis for such a liability and
many courts have overthrown the trust fund doctrine as the
basis for such a rule.49
The above liability rests in contract, being an indebtedness to
the corporation itself and not to the creditors. Each subscriber
is liable for the full amount due on his stock, irrespective of
whether all of the stockholders can pay or whether such other
stockholders are insolvent.50 The creditor, in order to maintain
his action, must be a judgment creditor who has not waived his
right or released the stockholder. 51
At common law, stockholders were not liable at all to the
creditors of the corporation unless the corporation was insolvent
and they were indebted to the corporation on account of their
stock, payment being necessary to pay corporate debts to cred-
itors; or unless the capital stock of the corporation, or a part of
48 Marion Trust Co. v. Blish (1908), 170 Ind. 686.
49 Unpaid subscriptions are like any other assets of the corporation when
it becomes insolvent, and may be collected, like any other asset, through the
interposition of a court of equity for the purpose of paying its debts, and
if the corporation has secretly agreed not to require payment, or if it- has
released the subscribers without consideration, the agreement or release
may be held void as against creditors on the ground of fraud. Hospes v.
N. W. Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174.
5o See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N. J. Eq. 86.
51 In addition it must be shown that the corporation is insolvent, that
the stockholder sued is liable to pay for such stock, that such stock has not
been paid for in full, and the existence of a debt or debts for which the
amount of the collection is to be paid on. The fact that stockholders are
subject to an additional liability imposed by statutes does not protect them
from payment of the full purchase price of their shares.
The question of permitting of set-offs often arises. Where the corpora-
tion is known to be insolvent, shareholders who are also creditors cannot
set off their debts against their liability for the par value of their stock.
Where, however, the corporation is a going concern, the tendency has been
to permit such a set-off. In the former case, however, the stockholder must
pay for the stock and then come in with the rest of the creditors for his
claim.
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it, had been unlawfully distributed or paid out to them. How-
ever, the Legislature clearly has the power to impose individual
liability for corporate debts upon shareholders, if such is done
at the time of creation of the corporation. Hence, we come to
the statutory liability of stockholders.52
In a number of states, provisions have been placed in the con-
stitution, or statutes have been passed, tending to make stock-
holders individually liable for the debts of the corporation. Such
provisions and statutes vary from state to state and, in some
states, from time to time. In some, perhaps the liability is
unlimited, while in others liability only in proportion to either
the amount or value of the stock held is had. In still other
states double liability is had, while in still other states the
liability is limited to the amount due on the stock. Hence, it can
readily be seen that the extent of the liability can only be ascer-
tained by a study of the governing statute.53
The statutory liability imposed may be either contractual or
penal.54 The effect of the statute and not the form determines
its character. Where penal, the right of contribution by one
stockholder against another is cut off.
The question is inevitably raised as to whether the liability of
the shareholders is joint or several. Under those statutes hold-
ing stockholders liable for corporate debts to the amount of their
stock for which they have subscribed, but not paid, seemingly it
would be best to construe the liability as several. Where no
limit is had for corporate debts, their liability seems to be joint.
Indiana holds that in the absence of anything showing a con-
trary intention on the part of the legislature, that the liability
imposed is several where such liability extends to the amount of
or to a proportion of the stock held by such stockholder. 55
52 Stockholders are not personally liable for the debts of the corporation
in the absence of a statute to that effect. Gainey v. Gibson (1897), 149 Ind.
58. The stockholders of a corporation are not individually liable for its
torts if they have not in any way participated therein, in the absence of a
contrary statute or provision. Hartzles v. Goshen Churn and L. Co. (1914),
55 Ind. App. 455. Of course, shareholders may render themselves personally
liable for corporate debts by agreement to that end, provided sufficient con-
sideration is had. Thompson Estate Co. v. Weinhard (1918), 247 Fed. 951.
5s Ordinarily, the liability of a stockholder for corporate debts is to be
determined by the laws governing the formation of the corporation and not
the laws of the state of the shareholder's residence.
54 A statute which directs or prohibits some act and imposes some for-
feiture for its violation is a penal statute. Otherwise, the courts construe
such as contractual. Flash v. Conn. (1883), 109 U. S. 371.
55 Shafer v. Moriarty (1874), 46 Ind. 9.
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For whose benefit is this statutory liability imposed? The
liability is not imposed for the benefit of the corporation and is
not to be construed in any sense as a part of its assets. The
corporation has no right to exercise this benefit for the creditors,
even where suit against the stockholder is had for the purpose of
raising a fund for the payment of debts.56 The provisions of
each statute must be consulted in order to tell for whose benefit
liability is imposed.
A perusal of the statute must also be made before answering
the question as to whether the statutory liability is primary or
secondary.57 In some jurisdictions there is an express statutory
provision that creditors must first look to the tangible assets of
the corporation before enforcement of statutory liability is per-
mitted. Where a single shareholder is proceeded against and
recovery had from him, a right of contribution against the other
stockholders is allowed him, even though a several liability is
imposed by statute.58
Hence, in general statutory liability depends entirely upon
the express wording of the statute and a close study should be
made of it in determining the stockholders liability in the various
states.5 9
Statutory liability having been imposed upon the stockholders,
the next question naturally arising is as to who are liable under
such statutes. It would seem to follow that every person in
whose name, as owner, stock is registered on the books of the
corporation, with his knowledge and consent, would be liable.
The conflict arises where a transfer of shares is had, some states
holding the transferor liable, others the transferee, and still
others both. The statute imposing the liability should cover
this point so as to remove all doubt upon the question. Where a
transfer is made to a man of straw or an insolvent person, all
jurisdictions hold that the transferor does not thereby escape
66 Hammond v. Cline (1908), 170 Ind. 452.
57 Where liability is primary, creditors may sue and collect from the
stockholders to the extent of their liability without first resorting to the
assets of the corporation and exhausting their remedies against it. Where
the liability is secondary, all remedies against the corporation must first
be exhausted, judgment and unsatisfied execution being a condition prece-
dent to their right to hold the stockholders upon their statutory liability.
5s Eviing v. Stulz (1893), 9 Ind. App. 1.
59 Some courts have held that creditors may waive statutory liability
for corporate debts. Morfleld v. Cincinnati, etc. Traction Co. (1924), 144
N. E. 689. It is doubtful whether other jurisdictions will follow the result
reached in this decision.
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liability, where such was the purpose of the transfer. In the
case of a bona fide purchaser from a subscriber of shares ex-
pressed to be fully paid, without notice that, in fact, such were
not fully paid for, the best authority seemingly excuses such pur-
chaser from paying the unpaid balance into the corporation
where the creditors seek to enforce such payment. 0° It would
seem better to excuse the innocent purchaser from such liability
and permit the creditor an action against the transferor, al-
though the argument can be made that the innocent purchaser
might have his action against the transferor.
Another question of prime importance is the liabilities of
Stockholders in an Indiana Banking Corporation. See. 6 of Art.
12 of the State Constitution provided: "the shareholders of every
bank or banking, company shall be individually responsible to an
amount over and above their stock, equal to their respective
shares of stock, for all debts or liabilities of said bank or bank-
ing company."
See. 3858, Burns' Statutes, 1926, provides: "the shareholders
of each bank or association found under the provisions of this
act shall be individually liable to an assessment of not to exceed
one hundred per cent of the par value of their respective shares
of capital stock, and in addition to all assessments for unpaid
subscriptions for capital stock or parts thereof, same to be levied
and collected as hereinafter provided, when such assessment is
required for the payment of the debts or liabilities of such bank
or association or to restore the capital stock thereof." The bal-
ance of the section states the procedure for assessment and col-
lection. Hence, in the light of these provisions, the stockhold-
ers liability to meet an impairment shall not exceed -one hundred
per cent, the top limit thereby enacted being a double liability.8 '
60 Ohio Statute provides: "the holder of a certificate for shares pur-
porting to be fully paid and non-assessable, who is without actual knowledge
of the non-payment of the full amount of the consideration therefor, shall
be under no liability whatsoever in respect thereof."
61 Liability provided by Art. 12 of the Indiana Constitution is for the
benefit of creditors of the bank. Furthermore, a shareholder who is also a
creditor of the bank cannot set-off its indebtedness to him against his con-
stitutional liabilities for its debts. Gentry v. Alexander, President of the
Bank of Gosport (1861), 16 Ind. 471. In Runner, Assignee, v. Dwigginw
(1897), 147 Ind. 238, the court held that the individual responsibility for all
debts to the extent of the amount of their stock, in addition to the amount
invested, was created exclusively for the benefit of creditors. Further, that
it is not a corporate asset, the corporation having no right or interest in
such statutory liability.
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Returning again to the liability of stockholders in private
corporations, other than banks, Sec. 4845 of Burns' Statutes
1926, provides: "Every stockholder shall be liable to the corpo-
ration for the par value of all stock owned by him, unless such
stock has been paid for the corporation at its par value, or unless
the articles of incorporation provide that such stock may be sold
at more or less than its par value, in which case, the owner of
stock shall be liable to the corporation only for the amount of
the sale price fixed in such articles until such amount has been
paid to the corporation."
Most of the states have statutes very similar to the above
Indiana statute-the effect being to impose a liability upon the
shareholder to the amount of his unpaid stock, for all corporate
acts, until the whole amount of the capital stock subscribed for
shall have been paid in. Seemingly, such a statute is to be
commended, a double liability only being reserved in the case of
banks due to the nature of their business and confidence reposed
in them.
(To be continued.)
